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The Legal Quality of Judicial Decisions
Cornelius F. Murphy, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION

In contemporary legal philosophy there has been a notable shift
in interest away from a concern with the structural and normative aspects of law towards an analysis of the specific ways legal rules are
created, extended, and modified. Law as an abstraction has been replaced by law as a flow of decisions. The newer orientation expresses
a widely held belief that "the concept of a legal system has an intimate
connection with the nature of the legal reasoning employed in legal
argument and judicial decision making."'
This new emphasis is obviously a step in the right direction. It is
foolish to elaborate systems of rules while simultaneously ignoring the
processes by which these rules come into existence. But while it is
important to understand the modes of law-making, one must also set
the inquiry within the context of the legal system as a whole. Theoretical reflections, devoid of the insights of rule making, tend to sterile
abstraction; the study of the decisional process divorced from its roots
in legal philosophy will be equally disoriented. We should not only
inquire how decisions are reached; it is also worth while to question
whether the results of the process by which rules come into existence
can qualify as law.
The problem is illustrated by consilering precedent. How can a
concrete decision qualify as law? If precedent is considered in terms of
Pure Theory, one may answer that the single decision is a law, if
authorized by the legal order. If authorized, the particular judgment
is an individual norm that stipulates a sanction, in a singular, nonrecurring situation. 2 By such an analysis the individual characteristics
of a case may be reconciled with legal theory. But that type of explanation is insufficient. To qualify as law, precedents must also pass muster
before some of the broader characteristics of legal theory. How, for example, can concrete decisions be reconciled with the accepted require* B.S., The College of Holy Cross; J.D., Boston College; LL.M., University of
Virginia. Professor of Law, Duquesne University.
1. Hughes, Rules, Policy and Decision Making, 77 YALE
Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 14 (1968).
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KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND THE STATE,
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ment that law, by definition, is a system of general rules? Is it accurate
to refer to judicial decisions as law when the purpose of the judge in
adjudicating is to resolve a particular controversy rather than create a
general rule? Does the essential specificity of cases prevent them from
being assimilated with some of the more universal requirements of a
legal system?
THE TEST OF GENERALITY

Towards a Reconciliation of Law and Precedent
In the American legal tradition the difficulties of reconciling a process of particular decisions with the more theoretical requirement of
general norms has been compounded by the emphasis placed upon
the existential aspects of judicial decision making. The legal realist
movement, in its effort to counter the assumption that "the law"
rather than judges decides cases, shifted attention from precedents to
the psychological processes by which judges actually resolved controversies. This change reflected their assumptions about the creation of
rules. From their perspective, the conscious decisional choice of the
court was the crucial step in the process of law making:
The basic pattern of legal reasoning is reasoning by example. It
is reasoning from case to case. It is a three-step process described
by the doctrine of precedent in which a proposition descriptive of
the first case is made into a rule of law and then applied to a next
similar situation. The stepsoare these: similarity is seen between
cases; next the rule of law inherent in the first case is announced;
then the rule of law is made applicable to the second case. This is
a method of reasoning necessary for the law, but it has characteristics which under other circumstances might be considered imperfections.
These characteristics become evident if the legal process is approached as though it were a method of applying general rules
of law to diverse facts-in short, as though the doctrine of precedent meant that general rules, once properly determined, remained
unchanged, and then. were applied, albeit imperfectly, in later
cases. If this were the doctrine, it would be disturbing to find
that the rules change from case to case and are remade with each
case. Yet this change in the rules is the indispensable dynamic
quality of law. It occurs because the scope of a rule of law, and
therefore its meaning, depends upon a determination of what
facts will be considered similar to those present when the rule was
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first announced. The finding of similarity or difference is the key
step in the legal process.
The determination of similarity or difference is the function of
each judge. Where case law is considered, and there is no statute,
he is not bound by the statement of the rule of law made by the
prior judge even in the controlling case. The statement is mere
dictum, and this means that the judge in the present case may find
irrelevant the existence or absence of facts which prior judges
thought important. It is not what the prior judge intended that is
of any importance; rather it is what the present judge, attempting
to see the law as fairly consistent whole, thinks should be the determining classification....
Thus it cannot be said that the legal process is the application of
known rules to diverse facts. Yet it is a system of rules; the rules
are discovered in the process of determining similarity or difference.3

Prior decisions are not rules of law before the present judge has
assented to their relevance; nor does the decision he reaches become
a rule until a future tribunal has given it a welcome reception. From
the realist perspective it could not be otherwise; concentrating upon
the mental processes of the judge, within the drama of litigation, they
had uncovered the spatio-temporal conditions for the growth of legal
rules.
Such an approach to the process of decision making is of immense
significance. Only with a full understanding of how judges act can
we appreciate the totality of rule making or the significance of- their
responsibility. Nonetheless, it remains necessary to reconcile all the
nuances of decision making with the more speculative requirements of
the nature of law. Returning to the principle of generality: how is it
possible to assimilate a theory that precedents have no normative power
until a judge assents to their significance, with the traditional requirement that for any phenomenon to be called "law" it must consist
of general norms, or standards of behavior?
The crucial position of an existential court in the growth of precedential law could be harmonized with the requirement of general
standards by emphasizing the authority by which judges decide. Judicial decisions are not the exercise of private power; judges are commissioned, by constitutional provision or general custom, with jurisdiction to hear and resolve controversies. Because they act pursuant to
a generic rule of jurisdiction, it is arguable that their decisions, while
3.

LEvI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING,

1-3 (1948).
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not a response to precedents as pre-existing rules, nevertheless occur
within the context of a legal order. Such an argument has plausibility,
especially when law is considered as a system of primary rules of
obligation plus secondary rules of discretion or power conferred on
persons to achieve a socially desirable result such as dispute settlement.
Yet such an approach is unsatisfactory; indeed, its insufficiency is
proven by its failure to gain the acceptance of Professor H. L. A. Hart,
the creator of the primary-secondary rule theory. Professor Hart
points out that to explain the reality of discretion solely in terms of
secondary rules overlooks the many ways in which, from other perspectives, the theory of precedents fulfills the theoretical requirements
of general standards of conduct. For example, in constant daily transactions, lawyers, in advising their clients, give advice by recourse to
existing prior decisions. Considered comprehensively, counsel is not
given solely with the "bad man" predicament in mind, i.e., with an
eye towards adjudicatory consequences. While there are large areas of
uncertainty in which recourse to litigation is contemplated, it would
surely be erroneous to describe all legal advice as a service rendered
provisionally. There is not constant recourse to courts for interpretation; in significant ways the precedents of decided cases are relied upon
by practitioners as presently existing norms. They are used as rules,
4
not simply as predictions of how courts will behave.
What of the judges themselves? From the "inner viewpoint" do they
in any way consider themselves bound by a body of rules, somehow
bound up with precedent, in spite of the fact that its applicability is
conditioned by their conscious acceptance? At this juncture it is important to understand why, from a judge's viewpoint, the concept of
precedent as a pre-existing body of rules makes little sense. The scope
of a precedent is conditioned by its factual basis; moreover there are
immense variants in life which may cancel or modify the force of an
otherwise relevant principle. In addition, even where precedent is
accepted as a "rule" its actual application will vary considerably. It can
be expanded or contracted depending upon the exigencies of an existing
controversy and the requirement of justice which it reveals.
Judges have discretion to limit, extend, or distinguish rules extracted from prior cases; this creativity is incompatible with a suggestion that, in using precedent, judges are only rendering obedience to
rules of law. For them, the function of precedent is to guide rather
4.
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than to control decisions. 5 But it is not necessary to speak of obedience
in order to establish that courts in their discretionary use of precedents
are responding in some way to general rules and thus working within a
legal system. It is clearly possible for a judge to simultaneously maintain
that he is not obeying "commands" but nevertheless looks upon
precedents as expressing a body of norms which circumscribe his
discretion. For the decisional process is a combination of creativity
and an accounting to the received authorities. Llewellyn, in his study
of the appellate process, has shown how judicial freedom and a regime
of general principles can be harmonized. The creative discretionary
choice:
moves in the main with steadiness . . . it answers carefully and

regularly to the body of doctrine as that body of doctrine has
been received and as it is to be handed on: ...

the creation never-

theless and simultaneously, but in full consonance with that high
responsibility to the Law, answers also to the appellate court's duty
to justice and adjustment. . . . [A study of reported cases bears
witness to] . . . the continuing dedication of our appellate bench

to that one of their twin duties which is to the Law. And, . . .
I want no stress on the duty to Justice, nor yet on the current
use of judges' human situation-sense, vital, powerful, and superb
though each is, to lead to any misinference that The Law should
be or is being thrust thereby into any second place. I hold, indeed,
that in the true Grand Style all 6of these elements join in a choir
like the fabled music of the stars.

By concentrating upon the attitude of the legal profession and the
courts toward the body of precedents, we have been able to overcome
some of the objections to an assimilation of judicial precedent with the
idea of law as a system of general rules. Precedents possess, in varying
degrees, the qualities of general standards required by legal definitions
in spite of the atomistic tendencies inherent in the decisional process
through which they are received and applied. By analyzing the attitudes
of those possessing authority to use law in the diverse functions of
counseling and litigation, it is reasonably clear that, beyond the range
of indeterminacy inherent in a dynamic legal process, there is a common
5.

K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, 179 (1960).

6. Id. at 191-92; cf. Dworkin, supra note 1, in which a distinction is drawn between
precedential rules which tend to require a certain result in a later case and standards
of policy and principles of justice which are embedded in a precedential history but
have less compulsive consequences. Dworkin struggles with the problem of reconciling
standards which do not function as rules with the obligation of the lawyer and judge
to "law." Some implications of this distinction are discussed, supra.
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core of acceptance of, and responsibility to, prior case law as the
repository of rules of behavior, standards, and principles.
! Yet it is not enough to measure the legal quality of precedents purely
in terms of "interior" perspective. There must also be a linking of
subjectivity with- objectivity on the exterior, positive plane of precedents. If the legal profession acknowledges that precedents constitute,
in some measure, a body of rules, this assent must have a foundation
firmer than the subjective belief of the participants. The decisional
pattern itself must, in some sense, be capable of creating the requisite
prescriptions; otherwise the profession would have nothing to which
they could give assent. We are thus back to the initial question: how
is it possible that judicial decisions, which are the resolution of particular controversies, can yield general rules of conduct, and thus be
termed law?
Precedents as Themselves a Source of Rules
Attempts to understand the process by which particular decisions
yield general rules have been hindered by debates over the meaning of
ratio decidendi, the phrase which Goodhart correctly characterized as
"the most misleading expression in English law .

"7

He equates the

ratio with the conclusion of the decisional process. American writers
frequently refer to it as the principle underlying a decision, but it
is never clear whether they mean the rule to be extracted as the result
of a decision, or a principle which formed the basis of the prior decision. Wambaugh, for example, equates the ratio decidendi as the
principle of the earlier case, but goes on to say that the opinion, while
not normally authoritative, will constitute binding authority to the
extent that it announces the principle actually dictating the decision.8 Llewellyn also seems to identify ratio with the ground upon
which the court itself had rested its decision. 9
This tendency to place the quest for a rule within the prior opinion
reflects the primacy with which realists endowed the subsequent judges'
choice. From their viewpoint, the distinction between what the earlier
judge announces as the rule of his case, and the "true rule," i.e., what
it will be made to stand for by a later court, is of decisive importance.
This also highlights the role of the advocate. He must persuade a
7.
8.
9.
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pending tribunal that a prior principle deserves to be applied to an
existing controversy.
This concentration on the contents of an opinion not only confuses
the meaning of ratio decidendi, but also obscures the rule making
power of precedents. The difficulty can be illustrated by an example:
Plaintiff housekeeper sues her employer for negligence. He demurs.
The court decides, in written opinion, that a master owes a duty to a
domestic-a decision reached upon analogy with the industrial rule
and the "reasonableness" of a treatise principle admittedly unsupported
by the precedents upon which it is based. A subsequent court may disaprove of the analogy; it may find the principles upon which it rests
untenable. To the extent that such a court has freedom, its disagreement with the prior opinion restricts stare decisis. Nonetheless, the
earlier case stands for the proposition that a master owes a duty of care
to a domestic servant. 10 The decision of itself yields this result, in spite
of its faulty justification. Indeed, such a result would obtain if there
had been no opinion at all. It is this self-productive quality of prior
decisions which deserves closer examination, for here the compatibility
of precedents with the requirements of a legal system becomes most
evident. And whatever the final meaning of ratio decidendi, it must
encompass this dimension of the decisional process.
Jurists agree that precedents yield rules of law; disagreement arises
at the point where the rule is to be found and how the discovery is to
be made. Realists tend to fix the locus of discovery in the mental process of a judge upon whom prior cases are being pressed by advocates
in litigation. Prior decisions are made into a precedent at that point;
before the subsequent court assents to its relevance, the prior case has
no existence as a legal rule. We have suggested that it is difficult to
reconcile that analysis with the attitude of judges and lawyers towards
precedent: bench and bar, in some aspects of their work, tend to treat
prior cases as pre-existing law. In addition, we advanced a second form
of objection to the extreme realist analysis. Something in the inner
nature of the decisional process, suggested by the term ratio decidendi,
implies that cases of themselves give birth to rules; that precedent is in
some way self-generative and not entirely dependent upon the psychological processes of a subsequent court in order for it to yield a
principle.
10.

Collins v. Harrison, 25 R.I. 489, 56 A. 678 (1903), reprinted in

MORRIS,

ON LAW IN COURTS,

MISHKIN AND

11 (1965).
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Such a possibility is intelligible in terms of induction: the drawing
of generalization out of particulars. It is important to distinguish two
ways in which induction is relevant to the judicial process. In its first
sense induction refers to the growth of precedent within the judicial
system. This is the perspective of legal realism, the concrete responsibility of an existing court to prior case law. In this sense induction
means the accumulated generalizations from experience, reflected in
precedents, which become, for the courts, working hypotheses to be
tested, and retested, for their conformity with the demands of justice."
Here the experimental nature of the inductive precedents is stressed,
a factor which complements the idea that the scope of a precedent is
conditioned by the receptivity of a subsequent court. But to grasp the
full sense in which inductive processes are operative within precedents
it is necessary to go beyond the viewpoint of the deciding judge, to
transcend the realm of the judicial process. The flow of decisions must
be examined in terms of their widest implications as well as in the
manner by which they gather meaning within the structure of courts.
In the example of liability to a domestic servant, it was argued that
there is a sense in which a case can stand for a proposition in spite of
its faulty reasoning or in the absence of an opinion. The ratio of a
case at least includes the principle which is the fruit of the litigation,
and this is a reality distinguishable from the justifications which can
be advanced for the result or the principle upon which the decision
was based. This consequence-the transformation of a particular controversy between specific parties into a general principle-is intelligible
in terms of induction. In this sense induction is not the equivalent of
provisional generalizations articulated by later courts; it refers rather
to an intrinsic process going on within the earlier case. The inner
dynamism of the case, rather than the psychological process of a later
court, becomes the center of attention. It is what occurs within the
movement of a case which is significant in the present context. From
the initial shaping of a controversy, to the establishment of the
essential facts, through the issue shaped by procedural maneuver, to
the final resolution by the court, there is a constant development at
work: the formation of the requisite stable empiric factors, fused with
conceptualization, which makes it possible for an appellate decision to
give birth to a general principle. It is a process of understanding by
induction; of discovering within the particularities of established
11.
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meaning the indirect universal which is given the juridical name of
precedent. It is what Oliphant probably had in mind when he wrote
of the scientific aspects of precedent and stare decisis:
[T]here is a constant factor in the cases which is susceptible of
sound and satisfying study. The predictable element in it all is
what courts have done in response to the stimuli of the facts of the
concrete cases before them ....
[T]he response of their induction
of experience to the stimulus of human situations is the subjectmatter having 12that constancy and objectivity necessary for truly
scientific study.
But of what import is the insistence upon the inductive qualities
of precedent? How does it add to the general effort to reconcile judicial
decisions with accepted definitions of law? To grasp the significance,
a distinction must be made between the horizontal and the vertical
consequences of precedent. Looking forward, stressing the progress of
case law prospectively within the judicial system, attention centers
upon the attitude of a subsequent court towards the earlier decision.
Here, the abstractive significance of precedent is conditioned by the
use which the new judge wishes to make of it. We are in the realm
of legal realism. But if we concentrate exclusively on this dimension
of the growth of precedent, we shall miss other significant ways in
which the inductive generalizations which are the fruit of decisions
contribute to our understanding of how precedent constitutes a
regime of law. We must also attend to what, for lack of a better symbol,13 I have called the vertical aspects of precedent: the way in which
the rules, principles, and policies of the law emerge from the results
of decisions and permeate the entire structure of our legal system and,
indeed, our civilization.
The capacity of a decision to yield a general rule is not absolutely
dependent upon its acceptance by a later court. This idea, while an
indispensible insight into the process of adjudication, fails to adequately
account for the inductive power of cases to yield, of themselves, general
principles. The realist perspective fails to account for the full dimensions of induction operative within the development of cases. Moreover,
a belief that precedent is nonexistent until applied flies in the face of
12. Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 ABA J. 71, 159 (1928). The same may
be said of Goodhart's insistence that the ratio of decisions lies in the same result reached
by a judge rather than in the reasons given for the decision.
13. Such an imagery is susceptible of misunderstanding. In using the terms "horizontal" and "vertical" I do not mean to include by the latter expression the position of
inferior or subordinate courts in an overall court structure.
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experience. If the radical realist theory was true, it would be impossible to make any coherent statements about the common law outside
the context of pending litigation. We have already adverted to the
way in which, from the inner viewpoint of practicing lawyers, precedent
is frequently accepted and acted upon as though it did constitute a
body of rules, its existence is presumed independent of recourse to
adjudicatory clarification. We would emphasize further the way in
which scholarly books and treatises purport to express common law
ideas as statable principles. Conceding the margin of error which
attends all efforts at generalization, there nevertheless remains in
juristic writing a sufficient reproduction of legal principles to refute
the postulates of extreme realism. The Restatements of the American
Law Institute are a case in point. To restate the law involves an abstractive process in which the creative thought of the jurist interacts
with the accumulated judicial materials. In this process it is difficult
to distinguish the jurist as creative innovator from the scholar who is
faithfully reproducing existing legal rules. But, for present purposes, it
is important to note that the treatise writer, the restater and the law
review author are all, in significant measure, extracting from the
wealth of accumulated cases basic materials for their reflections.
Warren and Brandeis expounded upon the ethics of privacy, but their
main argument was that the right was already recognized by common
law. Such speculations would be impossible if prior cases were devoid
of legal significance until the moment when later judges acknowledged
14

their status.

By viewing precedent from the "vertical" perspective of the jurist
generalizing, we can see more clearly why it is possible for the case law
to transcend the limitations of immediate controversy. We begin to
glimpse some of the range of inductive possibilities which are imminent to stare decisis. But we can also see a newer reason for calling
precedents "law." From their horizontal consequences, i.e., their
impact upon subsequent decisions, the characteristics of precedent as
rules was highlighted. Stress was laid upon their potential immediate
application to a new controversy; their obligatory character was highlighted. The same may be said of precedents as used by attorneys in
14. By stressing how precedents are operative outside the realm of the judicial process, we can also illuminate the scope of that process. The growth of the law within the
courts encompasses more than a reliance upon prior decisions; judges, in reaching decisions are increasingly influenced by independent scholarship as well as by earlier cases.
For some materials on this aspect of the decisional process see MsHKIN AND MORIS, op.
cit., supra, at 104-106.
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advising clients during day-to-day practice. But when we speak of the
impact of precedents upon the systemizing and creative juristic thought
we are not thinking of cases yielding "rules." The generalizations of
reflective thought are not sought for their coercive application. The
scholar thinks of cases more as a repository of accumulated wisdom
than as a source of prescriptive norms. We are in a realm in which the
accumulated cases constitute law more in the sense of the great objectives and policies of our legal system than in a sense of prescriptive
rules. Where the work is truly creative, the jurist looks to the materials
more for inspiration than for orders. He seeks the underlying spirit of
our constitutional and common law; an ethos which lies within cases.
At this level precedents qualify as law not because they yield rules
which can immediately measure behavior but rather because within
them repose the highest values of justice and freedom which are the
objectives of our democratic society.
THE TEST OF AUTHORITATIVENESS

The Authoritative Dimensions of Precedent
Raising the question of whether judicial decisions can qualify as law,
we have explored the problem in the light of the requirement that for
any phenomena to be called law it must constitute a regime of principles or standards of behavior which are in some Sense general, i.e.,
encompassing the entire community in which they originate. In spite
of the atomistic uses to which it has been put by legal realism, we have
seen that precedent can, in several respects, meet the test of generality.
While the provisional characteristics of precedents are highlighted
within the decisional process, their use as presently existing rules or
standards by the practicing lawyers and, to some extent by judges,
gives to precedent the socially prescriptive quality needed for it to be
called law.
As we moved from the internal viewpoint of those who feel an
obligation towards precedent to the external characteristics of the
decisions themselves, we increased the compatibility of cases with legal
definition. Concentrating upon the inner dynamics of the decisional
process-the movement from initial shaping of controversy through to
the judgment-we saw that inductively, i.e., as indirect generalizations
from particular constancies of meaning, the flow of decisions, of itself,
gives birth to general principles. The reality of this dimension of cases
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is confirmed by the influence which the accumulated decisions have
upon juristic writings-from the more formal restatements of the
law, to the more creative speculations of legal scholars.
In addition to these insights, it is possible to travel further in our
inquiry into the legal character of judicial decisions. Measured by the
standard of general norms, it may be possible to reveal other ways in
which the decisions meet this particular requirement. But it would
be more enlightening to shift attention to other elements of accepted
definitions of law. Leaving the realm of general standards of behavior,
let us turn to another characteristic of law-authoritativeness-and
evaluate the judicial process in the light of its requirements.
The importance of authoritativeness in a definition of law has been
highlighted by the work of the modern analysts. H. L. A. Hart has
drawn out its significance in his criticisms of the Austinian definition
of law as a command. Evaluating the imperative connotations which
have grown up around the use of the command theory, Hart felt that it
was
important to notice.., that the simple situation, where threats of
harm and nothing else is used to force obedience, is not the situation where we natutally speak of 'commands'. This word... carries
with it very strong implications that there is a relatively stable
hierarchical organization of men . . . in which the commander
occupies a position of pre-eminence. . . . More important-for

this is a crucial distinction between different forms of 'imperative'
-is the point that it need not be the case, where a command is
given, that there should be a latent threat of harm in the event of
disobedience. To command is characteristically to exercise authority over men, not power to inflict harm, and though it may be
combined with threats of harm a command is primarily an appeal
not to fear but to respect for authority. 15
Similar insights into the necessity of including authoritativeness
within a definition of law have been developed by sociological jurists.
Of particular interest for this study is the way that Lasswell and
McDougal, in their creative policy-orientated jurisprudence, have tied
the notion of authoritativeness very closely to the decisional process:
The distinction we make between decisions that are taken in
accordance with the expectations and processes of community
authority and other decisions may now enable us to clarify and
sharpen the conception of law we recommend. When decisions are
15.
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taken in the sense that severe deprivations, or threats of such deprivations, are marshalled to support demands or choices without
regard for authoritative community prescription, such decisions
are not law but naked power or unlawful coercion. The conception of law that we recommend is, accordingly, that of the process
of decision in which authority is conjoined with effective control.
...

It is only when we focus thus explicitly upon patterns of both

authority and control that we can achieve a conception of law
adequate to guide and facilitate the type and scope of investigation that our times demands.16
In defining law in terms of authority we can again stress the "inner
viewpoint," i.e., the attitude of those who are subject to the rules in
question. This is as true when the subject is precedent as it is with
any other aspect of legal phenomena. Considered inductively, a body
of decisions may be capable of generating the requisite general standards; they are not, on that account, law. Decisions of the International Court of Justice have the requisite universalizing potential, yet
the statute of the Court expressly limits the effects of the decisions
17
to the behavior of the parties involved.
Authoritativeness in the Common Law Process
In the areas of common law decision-making the attitude of society does not figure prominently in any assessment of authoritative
qualities of case law. The power of courts to make law has a societal
foundation, but it is grounded more upon customary acceptance than
upon an express grant. Normally, a court system has an explicit basis
in a state constitution. But this is as much the confirmation of historical experience as it is a conscious choice by society to create a
judiciary.
Social endorsement of judicial activity becomes important in limited areas, such as that of the relative competencies of courts and
legislatures to resolve social conflicts. Constitutional questions aside,
the perennial issue of the position of the judiciary vis-A-vis legislation
or legislative powers can be clarified when the relationship is viewed
from the perspective of society's understanding of institutional competence. To the extent to which courts must enforce statutes (a function
discounted by the leeways of interpretation), or defer decisions to the
16.

McDougal, Law as a Process of Decision: A Policy Oriented Approach, I NAT. LAW

FORUM 53, 57-58 (1956).

17.

I.C.J.

STAT.

art. 59. This limitation has not been entirely successful in practice.
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legislative branch, limitations on its autonomy can be understood as a
result of the relative allocation of authoritative power. In certain
areas, the courts are given a subordinate position by the society from
whom their adjudicatory power is ultimately derived.18
Beyond these types of questions, the main thrust of authoritative
analysis of common law must be carried on substantially within the
judicial system itself. When we pass beyond the basic allocations of
power, the deeper questions of authority arise in the internal interactions between courts, and between courts and 'practicing bar. The
issues are essentially intramural.
Authority connotes a right to be obeyed or followed. A significant
reflection of this meaning can be seen in the attitude of legal realism towards the judicial process. The realist views precedent through
the eyes of a judge who is being asked to apply it. From this perspective
receptivity is the crucial symbol. When courts are of coordinate jurisdiction, the later judge must not only be persuaded that prior cases
are relevant, but he must also be convinced that their reasoning is
cogent. "The rule", in Llewellyn's famous expression, "follows where
its reason leads; where the reason stops, there stops the rule."' 19 Earlier
courts are not automatically entitled to have their judgments accepted as standards of decision for future controversies. The justifications advanced for the results condition their extension. Here the
written opinion takes on special significance and confusions surrounding ratio decidendi become somewhat clarified. In the dynamic interaction between prior wisdom and present choice, there is a constant demand for rational explanation why earlier judgments should
guide immediate decision. The reasons for the earlier judgment became
crucial, which perhaps explains the realist tendency to equate ratio
with the ground upon which the court has itself rested its decision.
The same may be said of the relationship between bench and bar.
Whether the courts have a right to decide controversies as they do
is significantly dependent upon the reaction of the practicing bar
to the results. Societal supervision, to the extent it can be said to
exist, is principally exercised through this professional critique. The
court must persuade counsel that the decision arrived at was a just
18. The question whether legislatures are alone competitive to introduce principles
of comparative negligence into a legal system is illustrative. See Maki v. Frelk, 40 Ill. 2d
193, 239 N.E.2d 445 (1968) reversing Maki v. Frelk, 85 Ill. App. 2d 439, 229 N.E.2d 284
(1967); Comments on Maki v. Frelk-Comparativev. Contributory Negligence: Should the
Court or Legislature Decide?, 21 VAND. L. REV. 889 (1968).
19. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH, 157-58 (1951).
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and an appropriate choice in light of the authorities. The medium of
persuasion is the opinion, where points made, and arguments pressed
by counsel are answered by an appeal to reason, the sense of justice,
and a respect for law. It is a procedure used primarily as a palliative
for the loser, but one whose authoritative dimensions for prevailing
counsel are also significant.
Authoritative Dimensions of Constitutional Adjudication
The role of the people in common law decision making is slight,
but the level of participation rises when decisions take on a constitutional dimension. This is because of the different functions served
by judicial opinions in the two contexts. In the growth of common
law precedents, the opinion serves as the medium by which a court
seeks to persuade either present counsel or a subsequent tribunal
that its decision has a foundation in precedent and in the basic policies and principle of the common law. In constitutional adjudication these purposes remain, but a new dimension is added. Justices
of the Supreme Court write opinions with lawyers and other courts
in mind: the opinion is also addressed to the society at large. Constitutional litigation transcends immediate parties, it becomes a medium for the settlement of great public issues. As a result, specific
controversies are transformed into a unique colloquy between the
court and the people. Rather than addressing only its professional colleagues of bench and bar, the court speaks ".

.

. directly to the peo-

ple, as participants in an endless public conversation on the nature
20
and purpose of our law in all its application.
Thus, at the level of constitutional adjudication, the problem of
authoritativeness-the effort to develop a right to be followed-takes
on a unique meaning. But of what must the court convince the people, before its decisions can be characterized as an appeal to authority
rather than simply an exercise of power? How does the mode of
persuasion in this context differ from the arguments that one court
must gather to convince a later tribunal that its decision was justified? To begin to understand these difficulties it is important to
grasp the significance of the public colloquy.
The colloquy occurs through the communication of an opinion. We
have argued earlier that there is an important sense in which a deci20.

E. RosTow, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE, 88 (1962).
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sion can yield a rule even if it is not accompanied by an opinion.
Given the inductive dynamism of the decisional structure, it is possible to abstract from some controversies a general principle which
transcends the contingencies of litigation. Yet an opinion is desirable,
and, in the light of the authoritative elements of a definition of law,
it may be necessary. If authority is part of the fabric of law, precedent
must be responsive to its requirement. A written opinion expressive
of the reason for decision, becomes the way by which prior case law
gains a right to be accepted.
When we move to the plane of constitutional adjudication, the
reasons for requiring cases to contain written opinions are renewed
and gain additional meaning. We here add further reason for arguing
that decisions must be accompanied by an opinion if they wish to
be characterized as "law." In the constitutional context, a written
justification for a decision is required by the political theory which
lies at the basis of a democratic social order.
Where definitions of law are grounded in positivism, the justification for any decisional procedures need only be grounded upon some
formal authorization. The key question is whether the law-maker
is empowered to act. To the extent that the question is unanswerable
by textual reference, it is assumed to lie in some antecedent assumption. If constitutional interpretation does not satisfy one's curiosity
about the role of the Supreme Court in our society then a further
hypothesis about prior societal authorization, i.e., the grund norm,
must suffice.
Such an explanation is inadequate because it ignores the relationship between the court and democratic theory. It is commonly assumed
that the Supreme Court exists to promote democratic ideals. What is
not widely understood is the extent to which the court's function is
conditioned by democratic theory. In a democracy, the branches
of government flow from the people and their right to self-government. In this delegation there is an agency relationship, and agents
must make an accounting to their principals. The uniqueness of the
court lies in the fact that it is virtually unaccountable. The justices
are not subject to periodic elections, nor are their significant decisions subject to revision except through the unwieldy procedures of
Article V. Yet, if this decisional process is to constitute "law" in the
light of democratic theory, the court must in some way be subject
to control by the people. It is at this point that the opinion, and the
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public colloquy it generates, becomes indispensible. If we are to
maintain a requirement of authoritativeness, it must be conceded that
the Supreme Court is not automatically entitled to have its decisions
accepted. The court possesses no natural right to obedience; the people do not have an obligation to accept, without question, the decisional choice. As human persons, the people can be expected to
acquiesce in the court's constitutional interpretations only if the
decisions are just and compatible with the purposes of life in a democratic society. It is in this sense of a demand for authoritative decisions that the people supervise the exercise of decision by the court. 21
In the constitutional decision process a continuity is maintained
with the authoritative requirements of the common law tradition. The
Supreme Court may be a national school teacher, but, like the common law judges, it is also an advocate. Like them, it must persuade
courts and judges of the soundness of its rationales; it must also convince the people that its views of democratic theory have an adequate
foundation in the nature and purposes of human existence.
To this thesis several objections can be made. The most immediate
is that, under the guise of authority, the theory being advanced is
the equivalent of anarchy. If the realization of constitutional decisions is contingent upon popular acceptance, the consequences will
be chaotic: each individual will decide in his absolute freedom,
whether he wishes to be subject to the judgments of the highest
tribunal in the land.
The basic weakness of the objection is its assumptions about the
process of execution in constitutional adjudication. The decisions of
the Supreme Court are, in one sense, coercive. Where decisions are
not obeyed the court has available some machinery to enforce compliance with its judgments. But the processes of execution normally
associated with judicial power do not fully cover the nuances of constitutional implementation. Major decisions of the Supreme Court
imply vast social changes as well as the immediate adjudication of
rights. For its decisions to be fully realized the court must depend
upon a significant amount of cooperation from the general public
as well as a wide range of public officials. Monies must be appropriated
to pay for the extensions of social services required by decisions such
as Miranda and Gault; school boards must devise plans to implement
integration decisions; attitudes towards political power must be ad21. I have developed these ideas in an earlier writing, The Supreme Court and
Democratic Theory, 17 SYRACUSE L. REV. 642 (1966).
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justed if reapportionment is to be accomplished. The fulfillment ol
the goals set by the court requires a pervasive social activity which
defies analysis in simple terms of coercion or obedience to the threat
of sanctions.
When one speaks of the acceptance of decisions by the people in
this context, an anarchial situation is not contemplated. Rather one
is speaking in long-run terms; the relative willingness of the general public to adjust its mores and structures to the vision of the good
22
society which the court has proclaimed as an ideal.
A more important objection is. grounded upon the essential pluralism of our society. When common law judges seek to persuade
their successors of the wisdom of their decisions, the appeal is made
in the context of an assumed set of principles and values to which
all can refer as commonly accepted standards of evaluation. The main
ideals of justice and equity have a core of meaning to which the profession, however different the individual backgrounds, is capable of
assenting to. But in the colloquy between the Supreme Court and the
people the common standards vanish. The pluralism of America involves an immense variety of personal, religious and philosophic beliefs. The good is radically variable. In light of the diversity of
meaning and values, is not a normative appeal absurd?
This is a formidable objection, but before it is accepted as determinative, it is worth inquiring whether the exigencies of constitutional development require some effort by the court to develop
common aspirations or goals for our society.
The characterization of the Supreme Court opinion as a public
colloquy suggests a tendency, unique to this process of adjudication,
to achieve a rapprochement between court and people with respect
to our fundamental values and aspirations. With major decisions, a
considerable amount of time is expended by the judges to persuade
the people that the theories are a realization of, or are at least in
harmony with, the basic ideals and objectives of our civilization. We
are informed, for example, that voting equality implements an
objective which we agreed upon in the Declaration of Independence;23
that extensions of the Fourth Amendment concretize common aspirations about privacy;2 4 that decisions with respect to interstate com22. See MeCoskey, Reflections on the Warren Court, 51 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1260 (1965).
"Flamboyant gestures of defiance are not the problem ....
The greater difficulty is
presented by subtler forms of resistance-delay, evasion, and calculated inertia."
23. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
24. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 648 (1961).
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merce give contemporary expression to long standing economic purposes.25
This evidence that an effort towards the development of common
standards is integral to the decisional pattern has been accompanied
by some scholarly dissent over the means used by the court to develop
the necessary accomodation. What has predominated is a tendency to
direct the people through the incantation of instinctive value patterns
embedded in our national heritage. Constitutional objectives are
presented as bare facts, drawn from our national past, to compulsively
orient our future. The values and purposes which the court seeks to
preserve are treated more as the commands of our forefathers than
traditionally tested and retested aspirations of free men. Such a reliance easily turns into an attempt to impose upon the people what a
majority of the court believes to be the type or genius of the nation.
Such a procedure, with its inevitable distortions of history, has led
Professor Bickel to reply that:
only a society that strives to attain truth through reason is fit to
enjoy freedom of speech. Such a freedom, bestowed by judges
who rest it upon a historical hypothesis suspected of being (or
known to be) erroneous carries the fault of a profound inner
contradiction and is a very uncertain blessing. We require to
know, as accurately as may be, whence we come, in order to be
aware that it is our own reasoned and revocable will,26 not some
idealized ancestral compulsion that moves up forward.
If Supreme Court decisions are to meet the requirements of authority,
and thus be truly law, there must be a different emphasis in the
public colloquy. Appeals for acceptance based upon national heritage
are good in themselves, but when they predominate they can be coercive. Addressed simply as members of a national community the
people are asked to pattern their behavior around the given values
of our heritage. They are asked to become aware of the normative
structure which is a predetermined part of their being. What is needed
is a greater appeal to the people as persons living in a political society as well as units in a national community. Addressed as persons the people should be asked to follow the court's lead because
the objective ties of reason and justice require it. The arousing of
compulsive feelings should be replaced, in a greater degree than has
been the case, with an appeal to conscience, freedom and responsibility.
25.

General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964).

26.

BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS,

110 (1962).
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